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Why is this form of money management utilized? Who is the typical participant in ROSCAs? What sort of
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1 INTRODUCTION
Rabat is the capital of Morocco, but when mentioning
this country to many people, it is usually not the first
city that comes to mind. Instead, most foreigners will
only be able to name cities like Casablanca and Mar-
rakech. This is related to the fact that Rabat is not the
economic or social capital of the country; it is, however,
the administrative capital. It houses in near totality all
government buildings, in addition to many banks, non-
government organizations (NGOs), and company head-
quarters alike. Despite the presence of institutions such
as the national bank, there persists a centuries old infor-
mal banking practice known as money pooling or daart,
in Moroccan Arabic. How does this practice work in
the modern world? What does it mean for the future of
Morocco’s economy? These are the kinds of questions I
intend to answer through this research project.
There has been research on the topic of rotational
savings and money pools (ROSCAs) all over the world.
However, the specificities of its existence in the form of
daart within Morocco have yet to be investigated. This
paper intends to explore daart through multiple lenses,
such as utilitarianism, social economics, and religion
in order to give a broad overview of a niche subject.
These lenses are guided by several hypotheses. First,
that rotating savings has continued to persist among a
globalizing world in order to supplement or altogether
substitute welfare, providing access to the newly pri-
vatized necessities facilitated by the neoliberal state of
the world. In addition to functioning as a coping mech-
anism for economic needs, I also predict that daart is a
form of solidarity among participants, who are utiliz-
ing the long-standing practice of gift giving and social
economics to bind their communities together.
Research was conducted as a case study of Ra-
bat, specifically focusing on how daart exists within
modern society and affects those involved with them.
Through one-on-one interviews with scholars, youth-
aged women, and women currently involved in money
pools, information was gleaned about the idiosyn-
crasies of how this practice works in Rabat today, ver-
sus in the past. Ultimately this information was used to
make predictions about the future of Morocco’s econ-
omy.
1.1 Defining Key Terms
Daart: The Darija word describing a rotational saving
and credit association (see ROSCA definition). Possibly
derived from the verb “dara” meaning to rotate or turn.
Informal Economy: A framework for people or insti-
tutions to provide financial services, goods, and other
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exchanges away from the of the control of the State
or other authorities. Typical in market based “formal”
economies.
Neoliberalism: defined by Ashley Davis-Hamel as “a
political-economic philosophy that advocates a laissez-
faire approach to development by reducing state inter-
vention and relying on unfettered market forces, follow-
ing capitalist methods of free trade and market expan-
sion”1.
Rotational Savings and Credit Association: A group of
people who agree to supply a fixed amount of money
at designated intervals to a common fund. At each in-
terval, the total fund is received by one member of
the group to be paid-back in the future without inter-
est added. How the order of rotation is determined
varies but is typically either flexible or fixed and done
so through negotiation, creditworthiness, or at random.
ROSCA versus Microfinance: According to Hossein
“Informal banks are run and owned by the users of the
same socio-economic class grouping who participate in
alternative finance, whereas microfinance institutions
are professionalized and led by educated individuals
interested in reforming commercial banks”2.
2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Rotational Savings and Credit Associations
As mentioned previously, there is some written word
on the topic of ROSCAs, from both utilitarian economic,
and social economic viewpoints. However, when con-
sidering that this is a practice that has existed since
“before the naming of the social economy came into
being”, there is relatively “little to no mention of this
contribution in the literature”2. In this already limited
field of study, the information available about Morocco
specifically is almost non-existent. Despite the lack of
specific information, it is integral to understand the con-
cept of ROSCAs holistically before being able to look at
research on any individual country.
The vast majority of economic literature is conducted
from a utilitarian standpoint. Which, as described by
Professor of Sociology Dr. Ait Mansour, is a widespread
political doctrine believing that humans only do things
when there are benefits to be gained. It is perfectly ratio-
nal, and all actions are determined after weighing finan-
cial consequences and utility3. Using this ideology to
look at ROSCAs has certain strengths and weaknesses.
Among its strengths is that this viewpoint allows one
to look at ROSCAs objectively to see why someone may
or may not be involved in one. From a basic utilitarian
standpoint, participation in a ROSCA comes down to
the point at which it becomes more advantageous to use
a ROSCA versus an interest-bearing savings account.
To break this down: although on a cellular level each
member of the group will pay out and receive the same
amount of money over the cycle’s duration, the turn
you hold to receive the lump fund makes a difference.
The first person to receive funds is given the most credit
and is a net debtor throughout the cycle, during which
they pay back their debt. The last member to receive
funds is getting no credit at all and is a net creditor
throughout the cycle. This exemplifies why ROSCAs
are pareto-superior to individual savings accounts for
all participants except for the last member to receive the
money pot. The last recipient essentially just receives
their savings and is no better or worse off than if they
had not participated at all. The other members received
some amount of credit, allowing them to gain addi-
tional utility by lessening the time they had to wait to
make a purchase4.
These observations about positionality throughout
the cycle lend themselves to another interesting idea.
Some ROSCAs have fixed rotations that predetermine
the order in which the funds are received while oth-
ers have flexible turns allowing for more on the spot
decisions about recipiency. Theoretically, if positions
are predetermined, they should be done so based on
the individual’s risk of default. Those who are the least
risky would receive the money first, and those who are
most risky would receive the money last. By these con-
siderations, one’s advancement in the ROSCA cycle can
be compared to an increased credit line on a credit card
since there has been trust built over time4. For groups
with flexible rotations, there is higher risk of default
overall since those who lobby hardest to receive the
money may be most desperate and subsequently the
least likely to repay their debts.
The utilitarian strategy of understanding ROSCAs
has many weaknesses since it fails to consider that hu-
mans are not perfectly rational and there are multiple
external forces that substantially change people’s likeli-
hood of participating in a ROSCA. While opportunity
costs and pareto-positionality are important consider-
ations, they employ complicated economic jargon and
do not reflect the lived experience of the majority of
people who are actual ROSCA members. It also does
not give credit to the influence of the social economy
and utility gained through altruism, which this research
intends to consider more thoroughly.
Past the understanding of ROSCAs’ fundamental eco-
nomic basis, one finds an understanding of ROSCAs
that is more rooted in reality. At this realistic core, is an
“African tradition rooted in ancient systems of susus
and tontines” that serves to mobilize savings for people
in hugely meaningful ways2. The practice has differing
local names, such as susu, tontines, partner, meeting-
turn, box-hand, sol, and, in the case of Morocco, is called
daart. Existing research on the topic focuses largely on
the practice as it exists and has existed in Africa and
spread to other places such as the Caribbean or even
Canada through slavery and the African diaspora. Hos-
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sein’s research on this topic has been instrumental to
my understanding and has shown that “Pooled bank-
ing systems are embedded in social relationships, and
business is there to support people’s social lives” just
as much as their immediate monetary needs5.
The way that ROSCAs work in Morocco has the pos-
sibility of standing apart from the current subject pool
based in other areas of Africa and their evolutional
iterations for several reasons. Morocco exists at the in-
tersection of continents, races, and religions which has
made it into country full citizens with of strong transna-
tional identities. While some Moroccans are proud of
their African heritage, many people I have interacted
with during my time here often don’t see themselves as
African at all. That is, unless they are commenting on
how Morocco is the best place in Africa or the “excep-
tion” somehow. Because of this, I believe it is important
to conduct individualized research on ROSCAs in Mo-
rocco to fill this gap in knowledge and see, to what
extent, the current research in other places holds true
for Rabat, Morocco.
2.2 Morocco’s Economy
Morocco has a long and complicated history of wars,
dynasties, and foreign occupation, all of which have
had important and lasting effects on their economy. Mo-
rocco has been classified by the World Bank as a lower
middle-income country6. Economically, the country has
been described as “neither predatory nor developmen-
tal”, existing in some in-between stage instead7. Gen-
erally speaking, the country is a relatively data-poor
environment. The most recent official information on
the informal economy was published by the country’s
High Commission for Planning in 2014, which makes
any sort of data analysis difficult to conduct.
Despite the lack of reliable information about the
present economic situation, it is more than possible to
look at the country’s economic history in order to make
inferences about the process of arriving at today’s re-
ality. When Morocco gained their independence from
France in the 50’s, they were still largely dependent on
Europe, economically. Without their own secure eco-
nomic situation, they fell into debt and by 1983 had
little option but to accept structural adjustment pro-
grams from the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund7.
These loans were typically “aimed at reducing public
debt” in less developed countries, but also had certain
stipulations to their access. These stipulations included
“far-reaching reforms of existing economic structures”,
meaning the introduction of neoliberal economics and
reduction of barriers to trade.8 These neoliberal prac-
tices, implemented in many countries, has been the
catalyst for a trend towards the privatization of many
goods and services which were previously public. In ad-
dition to this observation, with two-thirds of Morocco’s
workforce involved in the informal economy, there is
very little protection available for the majority of the
citizens in this sector to shield them from economic
fluctuations and provide other basic needs9.
The younger generations have grown up with these
neoliberal practices and capitalism as commonplace.
This has created a divide between old and new ways of
life across generations as the economy continues to shift
away from more traditional values and practices. Ac-
cording to Benieddi, a local writer for Morocco World
News, “Children no longer see their parents and tra-
ditional values as an example to follow. Parents can-
not help their children compete in the new world”10.
While on paper the “new economy” may be statisti-
cally superior to traditional practices, these changes are
not necessarily reflecting a higher quality of life since
“health insurance and retirement are products that most
Moroccans cannot afford”10.
2.3 Relevance of Protest Movements
As mentioned, the presence of the current neoliberal
practices and the relatively unproductive industries that
have accompanied them have done very little to help
the large population of at-risk, low-income Moroccan
citizens. If anything, they have negatively impacted
them through the trends of privatization which often
times result in higher prices for consumers. These at-
risk populations have been increasingly active in the
protest scene, demanding more support from the gov-
ernment.
One of the most prevalent and organized protest
movements in the country is that of the unemployed
graduates. Another largely recognized protest move-
ment is comprised of teacher trainees. Dr. Ait Mansour
explained that higher education status in Morocco can
sometimes be inversely related to job opportunity3. Al-
though during my time in Rabat I have been notified of
several large protests, I have only ever encountered one
of them, my daily routine left largely disrupted. Life in
the medina is business-as-usual despite the more visible
unrest in the remainder of the city and country at large.
However, this is not to say that those who live in
the medina are not protesting in their own way. Phe-
nomena such as ROSCAs act as examples of what Scott
describes in his book as “weapons of the weak”, serving
as an indication of resistance from those categorized in
the lower class11. While they are not active participants
in direct forms of protest such as marches, sit-ins, and
other actions, they choose their own form of opposi-
tion that is rooted in their daily lives. This is similar
to the ideology promoted by African American schol-
ars of resistance through “self-reliance and group eco-
nomics”5. Daart groups are a form of resistance against
the hegemony of modern banking practice and require
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recognition and exploration through academic research.
3 METHODOLOGY AND STUDY
LIMITATIONS
In order to gain a better understanding the nature of
ROSCAs in Rabat, I collected qualitative data through
multiple interviews with various inhabitants of Rabat.
Specifically, I organized four interviews with women of
various ages, all of whom I had extensive interactions
with during my time in Rabat, focusing on women who
are active participants in daart. I did, however, inter-
view one non-daart participant who is a young adult,
to gauge how the practice is changing across genera-
tions. In addition to these interviews, I also began my
research by conducting interviews with two scholars,
Dr. Hicham Ait Mansour and Dr. Taieb Belghazi.
3.1 Research Design
Because I was conducting interviews with two cate-
gories of people, scholars and daart participants, I gen-
erated separate guidelines of questions for each, which
are included in this paper’s appendix. There is some
overlap in the questions for both categories, but ques-
tions for scholars focused on the topics of daart, collec-
tivism, equality, and protection for those who partic-
ipate in the informal economy. Their answers would
establish a better framework for the rest of my inter-
views. Conversely, the questions for other participants
were centered around their personal experiences with
and knowledge about daart. Interviewees guided the
conversations themselves, and consequently there were
small differences in questioning from interviewee to
interviewee.
Before each interview I explained to each participant
the topic of my research and made it clear that they
were by no means obligated to speak with me. All of
my participants were proficient in English, so all inter-
views and explanations were done so in English. Since
I am familiar with both French and Arabic, I was able
to fill in some gaps in knowledge when participants
did not know specific words, however I would not be
comfortable conducting an entire interview in either
language. I obtained each participant’s verbal consent
to interview them as well as to audio record our conver-
sation. I did not ask for their consent to include names
in the study, so pseudonyms will be used for all partici-
pants and all other identifying features will be excluded
in order to ensure their confidentiality.
Since all interviews were conducted in Rabat, with
Rabat locals, it made sense to classify this research as
a case study. I do not want to portray this as an ex-
haustive study or representative of the entire country.
I’m not confident that the sample size of interviews is
large enough to even be representative of just Rabat.
However, I posited that it would be better to have a
semi-representative case study of Rabat than to try and
conduct surveys around the country and have the re-
sults be less accurate. It was necessary that I considered
my time and resources, which will be discussed further
on.
3.2 Ethical Considerations and Positionality
Although my research topic is not inherently sensitive
in nature, money habits can be deeply personal, and
there are numerous important ethical considerations to
mention. The first concerns my relationships with the
participants. As previously mentioned, I had relation-
ships with each of them prior to the interviews since all
participants were in some way contacted through the
institution where I completed my studies. In order to
try and maintain professionalism and ensure there were
no conflicts of interest, I was thorough in explaining to
participants that they were not obligated to speak with
me. I also explained that the information they decided
to share would be used for research purposes, but their
identities would be kept anonymous.
Also worth addressing is my personal positional-
ity throughout this research. I am a white, American,
upper-middle class student who is incredibly privileged
to be able to come into Rabat for several months to study
and research. These characteristics not only affected the
way my interviewees interacted with me and decided
which information to share, but also in my own un-
derstanding and interpretation of the data I collected.
My lack of ability to communicate fully in Arabic also
changed the way I was able to conduct my research as
well as limited the information I was able to read on my
topic ahead of time.
Since I had relationships with all my participants
prior to interviews, this affected the pool of people I
had access to in terms of their socioeconomic status.
All participants, excluding one student, were employed
in full-time positions in jobs included in the formal
economy. This has significant implications for findings,
seeing as a large number of daart participants are not
employed in these sectors and may have differing expe-
riences as a result.
Lastly, it is worth noting that my research took up
only four weeks of what was already a very brief stay
in Rabat. This ultimately limited the scope of what was
practical to complete. Time and resources were not avail-
able to conduct a study that is fully representative of
my topic. There are undoubtedly more considerations
that could have changed the research findings, such as
the fact that all interviewees were women, but those
reviewed in this section were of the greatest concern.
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4 FINDINGS: THE FUNCTION OF ROSCAS IN
RABAT
In order to give an overview of how daart is used as a
practice in Rabat, a broad overview will be given first.
This will be followed by a comprehensive overview
of all interviews, with the discussions broken up into
the three subtopics of Islam, capitalism and neoliberal-
ism, and the social economy. Since the phenomena of
ROSCAs was unfamiliar to me prior to beginning re-
search, the original assumptions and hypotheses were
challenged and disputed in surprising ways throughout
the interviews with daart participants.
Demographics were a deeply interesting topic that,
admittedly, did not get explored deeply in this research.
However, the qualitative information collected reflects
that, while the majority of daart participants are women,
it is not unusual for men to also be involved in these
groups. Age fluctuates across participants, but gener-
ally begins after the completion of school and includes
people of all ages who have some sort of income.
Prior to conducting interviews, there was a hypoth-
esis that participation in daart was determined on a
binary basis. Either Moroccans were forced to join
ROSCAs because of exclusion from and restrictions of
modern banking, or they participated in them for purely
social reasons. The research indicates that this binary
nature holds true to some extent. However, not all Mo-
roccans who participate in daart fall into the same cate-
gory. The reality is a more complex, combined version
of the original hypothesis. Usually, there is one person
who needs a large sum of money for a purchase. This
person becomes the organizer of the ROSCA, and con-
tacts their friends and coworkers to ask if they would be
willing to join in the daart. This organizer falls into one
category, but it is often the majority of members who be-
long to a second category. The second group is made up
of those who do not necessarily need to participate but
do so in solidarity with their friends and acquaintances
who need help. In addition to these factors, altruism
and cultural norms are also important considerations
that will be explored further.
The descriptions of daart groups varied across inter-
views, but there were general trends. For example, par-
ticipants spoke of older women who did daart with as
little as 20 dirham (Moroccan currency). For one partici-
pant, 1,000 dirham was the most she had ever utilized,
while for another 1,000 dirham was the average amount
of her groups. These differences reflect differences in
age, income, and the needs of the rest of the group. An-
other factor that varied, to a lesser degree, is the number
of members in each daart group. Interviewees expressed
their desire to keep the group small in order to lessen
the waiting time for their turn, as well as for general
ease. As a general rule, the groups were made up of
more than 4 but less than 10 people each.
Participants described all sorts of different things
that the sums of money were typically spent on. The hy-
pothesis that money was spent as a substitute for public
services and expenses, such as healthcare, did not hold
true in the interviews. One participant, Maha, described
that, in her experience, “they want to have it around
the time of the sacrifice to have enough money for eid al
kebir, or for school for children, or to have it at the time
of vacation end of august or July”12. Fatima, another
participant, shared that she spends the money she re-
ceives in her turn on rent and sports equipment13. It
appears that the majority of daart participants choose to
spend money on entertainment and more luxury items
and experiences rather than on absolute necessities.
Outside of these general descriptions of daart as a
practice in Rabat, three major themes revealed them-
selves during preliminary research and interviews.
These themes were religion, capitalism, and anti-
utilitarianism. Each theme was thoroughly explored
through research. The following is a breakdown of find-
ings within these three themes.
4.1 In Relation to Islam
The majority of Morocco’s population identifies as Mus-
lim, and the King of the country holds the title of “com-
mander of the faithful”. Islam plays a large part in dis-
cussing Morocco as a country, but it also affects the lives
of average Moroccans in smaller, but largely impactful,
ways. Exploring the relationship between the popular-
ity of practicing daart in Morocco and the presence of
Islam was done so through interviews by asking about
the concept of zakat, which is the pillar of Islam related
to almsgiving and facilitating the flow of wealth from
wealthy to poor. This served as a good entry point to
conversation about Islam since it did not involve di-
rectly asking about the religion of the interviewees or
their personal financial status. It turned out that most
research participants brought up their religion or Islam
in our discussions before I even had the opportunity
to ask about it. This confirmed that Islam is central to
many different aspects of life in Morocco, including
financially, through ROSCAs.
In Islam, there is a concept called “riba”, meaning
usury, which is forbidden in the Quran and classified as
haram. In the Quranic verse 3:30 (Translated by Muham-
mad M. Pickthall) it is stated “O ye who believe! De-
vour not usury, doubling and quadrupling (the sum
lent). Observe your duty to Allah, that ye may be suc-
cessful.” This is one of multiple verses that discourages
charging interest. Because of this, many Muslims will
not use modern banking, and daart presents itself as
a natural alternative, since the absence of interest is a
fundamental aspect of ROSCAs. It is also notable that,
according to Hossein, “many Muslims do not charge
a ‘service fee’” to participate in ROSCAs “whereas a
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number of Caribbean groups in a partner bank require
a fee of twenty dollars to go to the person managing
the fund” for what I assume are similar reasons related
to riba5. This characteristic of interest being haram has
also led to the modern phenomena of “Islamic banks”
in Morocco, which several participants mentioned in
their interviews. According to Dr.Belghazi, the “ratio-
nale for this Islamic banking is banking which does not
operate with the logic of banks, where you have profit
and so on. They present themselves as adhering to a
logic that is not mercantile”14. Customers come to the
Islamic banks and describe what it is they would like
to borrow money for, typically large purchases such as
cars or homes. The Islamic bank proceeds to purchase
that asset for the customer, who then pays back to the
bank the price seemingly without any interest over time.
However, these Islamic banks have a reputation for in-
creasing the incremental payments in order to make
up for this “interest-free loan”. The final payment sum
amounts to greater than the interest that would have
been paid on a loan from a modern bank. Those who
spoke about Islamic banks in interviews shared the sen-
timent that the name is largely a marketing tactic, but
that other people did utilize them regardless, justifying
that it is “bayeh aw shirah”, or pay and sell.
Despite loans from banks being haram, numerous
Moroccans choose to take them out. According to Maha,
who has participated in daart for almost 30 years, taking
loans from the bank is sometimes necessary, and should
not be punished because:
“It’s economic thing, it’s not in the past, maybe
in the time of the Prophet or the first time of
Islam it was maybe not Muslim people who
want- who can borrow the money to the peo-
ple and they want them to return it double
or triple, this I can understand. Here it’s help-
ing with, it’s like they are working for us. . . I
don’t know, it’s not I don’t think about Islamic
thing, it’s an economic thing. Here it’s helping
with, it’s like they are working for us. . . and
everyone did it”12.
In order to make large purchases, Moroccans must
either go to the bank and receive a loan, going against
their personal beliefs, or go without that purchase. Fa-
tima, a woman in her 30s described this, saying:
“I think especially in the big cities people take
the loan from the bank because they don’t
have any choice. And some of them who take
the loan are, you know, they told me it’s like
a war between them and the bank and Allah.
Because the money at the end of each month,
they don’t find any money with them, all dis-
appears”13.
These two observations begin to indicate the complexi-
ties of how Islam is involved in daart, as well as peoples
finances overall.
The original hypothesis that Moroccans use daart to
replace state welfare due to the exclusion from modern
banks was challenged and disputed in interviews. In
fact, almost the opposite holds true. Although partici-
pants described difficulty getting loans without proper
paperwork and proof of income. Instead of being forced
into using daart, the reality is that daart is not able to
fully finance most large purchases that people would
be seeking loans for in the first place. Subsequently,
Moroccans have little choice but to accept loan terms
from the bank, although it is not their preference. Islam
also had important implications in relation to the social
economy, which will be discussed in the next thematic
section.
4.2 Collectivism and the Social Economy
At the beginning of research, it was unclear if the re-
lationship between community and ROSCAs was a
chicken or egg scenario. Meaning, if the community
facilitated the daart group or if the presence of the daart
group created a community. Through interviews, trust
was a topic that came up repeatedly, which led to the
seemingly obvious discovery that most people are not
willing to give their money to a complete stranger. This
turned out to be a driving force behind how participants
decided how and when to participate in daart.
As previously described, the formation of a daart
group often begins with one person who is in need
of money the most urgently. This person will then con-
tact friends, family, and acquaintances asking them if
they will join the group, telling them how much money
would be paid each turn and how many participants
would be involved. In interviews with Maha and Aicha,
both women stated that although they were not the one
in need of the daart group, they would participate re-
gardless in order to help whoever is in need, especially
since it is not outright charity12. People see daart as a
way to help others and be social, but with the caveat
that they will be getting their money back at some point,
creating the distinction between zakat or charity, and
sehlef or borrowing. As Maha describes it, “I can say
that it is a social, we support each other, it’s like a social
group, to help them without giving them this money
and you will not have it”12.
This social aspect of collectivism and helping one an-
other is a deeply rooted cultural feature of Morocco. Dr.
Belghazi mentions this, describing that in the colonial
period and before, a concept called twiza was present
in Morocco. Twitza was the practice of helping one an-
other, and was especially common among those in the
countryside14. The presence of both twiza and the so-
cial economy in Morocco are consistent with Marcel
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Mauss’ writings on “The Gift” in primitive societies15.
In this social economy, the act of participation in giving
and receiving from one another makes strong alliances
and communities between people.15 This becomes a
sort of positive feedback loop where the strong commu-
nities built through giving to one another encourages
citizens to feel comfortable enough to ask for help, such
as through daart. So, while there is a certain amount of
utility gained from altruism of helping a peer, there is
also a human connection and societal expectation com-
pletely separate from this altruism which perpetuates
the occurrence of phenomena like daart.
While this strong sense of community and willing-
ness to ask for help are inherently good things, there
are also important concessions to be made on this topic.
As explained by Gibson-Graham, community does not
mean homogeneity, and in a community such as the
medina of Rabat, not all people have the same experi-
ence16. Also, it is important to avoid positioning the
community economy “as ‘other’ to the so-called ‘real
economy’” since both forms of conducting business are
just as real and impactful as one another16.
Another important caveat is the differing opinion
from a youth perspective. In speaking with Roquia, a
college student, it became clear that not all Rabat resi-
dents see daart as practical or recognize the more social
aspects of participating. Roquia described how she did
not think she would ever do daart in the future since, to
her, it is the same thing as just saving her own money17.
However, in other interviews, participants noted that
they did not become aware of or join a daart prior to
finishing school or obtaining a job with an income, and
Roquia’s view could be another representation of this.
Trust and the desire to help others were central as-
pects of all interviews surrounding the catalyst for join-
ing a daart group. This reflects the strong social econ-
omy present in Rabat and the residual gift economy still
present in an otherwise modernizing city. Instead of do-
ing daart for utilitarian purposes of strictly benefitting
financially, participants were much more concerned
with the well-being of their peers and perpetuating a
collectivist culture.
4.3 As a Response to Neoliberalism and
Capitalism
In an increasingly globalized world, Rabat is not un-
touched by the presence of capitalism and other neolib-
eral practices. Multinational companies such as Car-
refour have multiple locations in the city, and there
are tourists in the streets each day. ROSCAs however,
are not a post-capitalist system of economics but a pre-
capitalist one, to some extent. This makes for a very
interesting contrast in the lives of Moroccan citizens, as
traditional and modern methods of business come face
to face.
According to Gibson-Graham, “the qualities associ-
ated with economic transactions mediated by the (capi-
talist) market” are that it is “anti-political, asocial, indi-
vidual, dis-embedded, rational, efficient, short-term, cal-
culable, incontestable”, etc16. All these qualities stand
in stark contrast with the qualities just laid out in the so-
cial economy perpetuated through daart and ROSCAs.
This is because practices like daart “are collective in
nature and they are not driven by profit” unlike the
development-centric nature of neoliberalism and capi-
talism2.
Using daart and ROSCAs as an alternative to more
widespread capitalistic systems of conducting business
goes back to ROSCAs as a weapon of the weak. Al-
though participants may not see their own actions in
this light, it is a challenge to hegemony, nonetheless.
As stated by Hossein, “The ways in which persons of
African descent organize in the social economy is vi-
tal to unravelling the market fundamentalist view that
there is only one way to do business in society”5. This
is an important stance to take in a place where neolib-
eralism’s hooks are less culturally vital, in contrast to
countries such as the United States.
Some Moroccans do favor these ideologies to the col-
lective and social nature of the majority. In conversation
with Maha, she described this by making an example
of her cousin who is an economist, saying that, “In eco-
nomics, daart isn’t something that they study there. So
they say ‘okay it doesn’t exist. We cannot help each
other with this’”12. In this same category is Roquia,
who posited that she would rather keep her money to
herself for the fear that it would not be repaid by the
other members of the ROSCA17.
Although the interview participants did not directly
address capitalism by name in their interviews, it was
a relevant topic in other ways. For example, part of
Fatima’s justification for using daart is that that using
modern banks and accepting loans makes her less “free”
to do as she pleases13. The preference of utilizing alter-
natives to modern banking is a welcome reminder that
there is more than one way to do business, and that
challenging the norm can be done through small acts of
daily resistance.
5 CONCLUSION
Coming from a Western standpoint, I had little knowl-
edge of what ROSCAs meant to people or how they
were used. Because of this, my preliminary hypotheses
were either inaccurate or not asking the right questions.
Luckily, the opportunity to do research allowed for fur-
ther understanding of ROSCAs and those who partic-
ipate in them. For the most part, people participate in
daart with those in their communities for a variety of
reasons, but not necessarily as a substitute for social
welfare. Instead, people are motivated by supporting
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those in need, and convenience of daart over banking
for daily purchases.
As stated, I did not have the time or resources to give
a fully comprehensive review of this topic. For contin-
ued research on the topic, it would be interesting to
do a similar case study between two countries, both
with Muslim populations that were previously French
colonies. I would analyze how ROSCAs are used differ-
ently in each country to determine more contributing
and individualized factors of participation and popu-
larity. Also notable is that, since all interviews were con-
ducted with women, it would be more representative
of Moroccan daart to expand interviews outside of just
the female perspective. Despite first impressions, I have
come to realize that it is not taboo for men to also par-
ticipate in daart groups. Lastly, future research would
benefit from studying differences in participation be-
tween the different ethnic groups present in Morocco,
as well as across regions of the country.
History is currently at a crossroads of sorts. Are we to
continue on our current trajectory and do unrepairable
damage to our planet and relationships with one an-
other? Or do we re-connect with our communities and
the Earth to change the way we live our lives and con-
duct our business for the good of the future? Thinking
about Moroccan ROSCAs is a part of this questioning
about how we live and organize our lives. The story
of daart is just one example of the impressive nature of
ROSCAs all over the world, and their ability to tie indi-
viduals together and allow them to command their lives
in ways that would not be possible on their own. Per-
haps a more collective society on a global scale, where
care is taken for the economic and social wellbeing of
our peers, could be part of the solution to our discon-
nect with ourselves and with our communities.
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